The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber\u27s \u3cem\u3eVictims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims\u27 Rights\u3c/em\u3e by Elias, Robert
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 1 Article 6 
1-1-2004 
The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber's 
Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' 
Rights 
Robert Elias 
University of San Francisco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Elias, The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber's Victims in the War on Crime: The 
Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 225 (2004). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol52/iss1/6 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BOOK REVIEW
The Law of Personhood:
A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber's
Victims in the War on Crime:
The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights
ROBERT ELIASt
INTRODUCTION
Currently pending in the U.S. Congress is the Victims'
Rights Amendment (S.J. Res. 1). Sponsored by Senators Jon
Kyl (R-Arizona) and Dianne Feinstein (D-California), and
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, this proposed
amendment to the U.S. Constitution would guarantee
victims of violent crime the rights to be notified, present,
and heard at each critical stage of the criminal process. The
culmination of a series of state and federal legislative
initiatives (including past amendment proposals) for
victims over the last 30 years, the Victims' Rights
Amendment would finally enshrine victims into their
appropriate place under the Constitution. The proposal's
many backers, including legislators, presidents, governors,
attorneys general, law enforcers, constitutional scholars,
and victim groups,' have hailed the passage of this
t Professor of Politics and Chair, Legal Studies Program; University of San
Francisco. B.A. University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Penn State University
1. More specifically, supporters include victim groups (such as Parents of
Murdered Children, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and the National
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amendment as a prospective great day for crime victims.
How could it be otherwise?
If so, then why-in addition to its many supporters-
has the proposed constitutional amendment also generated
its detractors? The amendment has been opposed by
prosecutors, civil liberties groups, and even by several
victim organizations.2 The amendment's advocates claim
that state victims' legislation and amendments are
insufficient, that the victim's original rights under the
Constitution will be thus restored, and that the scales ofjustice will finally be balanced rather than favoring the
offender.3 Opponents argue that existing state initiatives
should be better enforced, that victims should not be
granted special constitutional status (since crime violates
the community as much as individual victims), and that
victims' rights will undermine due process and the
presumption of innocence in the courtroom.4 They further
Organization of Victim Assistance), law enforcement groups (including the
National Association of Police Organizations, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the International Union of Police Associations, and the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association), 49 of the 50 state governors, both the
Democratic and Republican Party platforms, former President Bill Clinton and
Vice President Al Gore, Attorney General John Ashcroft and four former
Attorneys General, and President George Bush. Senate Judiciary Committee
Approves Kyl/Feinstein Crime Victims Rights Constitutional Amendment(September 4, 2003), at http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Releases/r-vicrights-
comitteel08.htm (last visited February 25, 2004) [hereinafter: Senate Judiciary
Committee Approves].
2. More specifically, opponents include Citizens for the Fair Treatment of
Victims (www.citizensftv.org) Survivors Advocating for an Effective System,
Safe Horizons, Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation, the National
Network to End Domestic Violence, and the National Clearinghouse for the
Defense of Battered Women. See American Civil Liberties Union, Wrong Answer
to Victim Rights, at http://www.aclu.org/criminaljustice.cfm?ID=9955&C=249
(last visited February 25, 2004) [hereinafter Wrong Answer to Victims' Rights].
Note that many of the opponents are women's groups; for more on this, see
ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS STILL: THE POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF CRIME VICTIMS(1993) [hereinafter VICTIMS STILL]. Opponents also include conservative
columnist George Will, who has argued that, "There should be a powerful
predisposition against unnecessary tinkering with the nation's constituting
document, reverence for which is diminished by treating it as malleable."
ACLU, Senate Panel Approves Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Victims
Rights (September 4, 2003) at http://www.aclu.org/news/NEWSPRINT.cfm?ID
=13454&C=249 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
3. Senate Judiciary Committee Approves, supra note 1.
4. In response to these claims, one wonders: if victim legislation and
amendments at the state level could or do work well enough (to not warrant a
U.S. Constitutional amendment), then are not the state initiatives already
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claim that the amendment would promote hasty pro-
secutions and wrongful convictions, since victims could
inappropriately influence the judge and jury throughout the
trial instead of merely with their testimony on their own
behalf.5
While opponents are heavily outnumbered, the debate
has hinged not merely on the merits of the case but also on
the competing symbols each side has mustered either for or
against the amendment. It seems that no aspect of social
analysis escapes the overarching and obligatory context of
the continuing war on terrorism. Thus, supporters justify
the amendment in part because the judge in the Oklahoma
City bombing case excluded victims from watching the trial
(unless they were factually testifying) if they also sought to
testify later at the sentencing hearing.6 Advocates have
argued that this violates victims' rights.
On behalf of the amendment's detractors, however,
Beth Wilkinson, a federal prosecutor in the Oklahoma City
case, claimed that had victims been able to use the
amendment to block the plea agreement of Michael Fortier,
who was granted leniency in return for damning testimony,
then Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols probably would
not have been convicted.7 Bud Welch, whose daughter died
in the bombing, opposed the amendment, arguing that
"crime victims are too emotionally involved."' And Patricia
Perry, mother of a police officer killed at the World Trade
Center on 9-11, claimed that rather than the amendment,
accomplishing what opponents fear-undermining due process in trials? In any
case, see Citizens for Fair Treatment of Victims, Why You Should Oppose a
Victims' Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution at http://www.
citizensftv.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2004); American Civil Liberties Union,
Wrong Answer to Victims' Rights at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/
CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=9955&C=249 (last visited February 25, 2004); Rights
and Wrongs for Victims WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at A34; Bruce
Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment is a Bad
Idea, THE NATION, 10 Feb. 1997, at 11-19; Editorial Board, Victim Amendment
Undoes Prior Work, SEATTrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, April 21, 2000, at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/victed.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Victim Amendment Undoes Prior Work].
5. On the other hand, opponents also fear (somewhat contradictorily) that
victims might gain control over the plea bargaining process, that victims might
be pitted against prosecutors, or that victim participation might undermine the
just or sufficient punishment due to offenders. Id.
6. Senate Judiciary Committee Approves, supra note 1.
7. See Wrong Answer to Victim Rights, supra note 2.
8. Victim Amendment Undoes Prior Work, supra note 4.
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"the best way for Congress to support victims and their
families is to promote and support a system of justice that
provides fair and just convictions of the criminals
responsible for these crimes.'
And so the argument goes. Such competing claims have
long defined the contours of the debate about victims'
rights. The flood of state and federal victim legislation,
including amendments and bills of rights, suggests that
proponents have mostly won the argument. Apparently, the
victims' rights movement has succeeded, and victims have
benefited as a result.
But according to Markus Dirk Dubber, director of the
Buffalo Criminal Law Center at the State University of
New York, the success may be more apparent than real. In
his book, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse
of Victims' Rights, Dubber argues that most victims' rights
initiatives have not helped victims, and often made things
worse. The dispute over victims' rights has not merely
employed political symbols. The legislation itself has been
almost entirely symbolic instead of tangible-and this is no
accident.1
Moreover, Dubber claims that the prevailing debate,
itself, about victims' rights is misguided. While Dubber
would likely join the opponents of the proposed Victims'
Rights Amendment, both sides-he would argue-make
misleading assumptions and draw inappropriate
conclusions about what really serves victims' rights. Do
victims want harsh punishments? Are they good for
victims? Does punishment have any real relationship to
victims' rights? Are violations of due process only harmful
to offenders and not also to victims? Is crime primarily an
offense against the community and against victims as an
abstract category, or rather against victims as individuals?
Does victim interference in the criminal process jeopardize
fair trials and defendants' rights, or instead threaten far
more important interests? Do most victim initiatives benefit
victims or rather witnesses and survivors?
9. Wrong Answer to Victim Rights, supra note 2.
10. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USES AND
ABUSES OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 173-74, 212-13 (2002) [hereinafter VICTIMS IN THE
WAR ON CRIME]. See also Robert Elias, The Symbolic Politics of Victim
Compensation, in 8 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J., 213 (1983); ROBERT ELIAS,
VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM: CRIME VICTIMS AND COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1983) [hereinafter VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM].
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Dubber addresses these and many other questions in
his book, and not casually. Victims in the War on Crime
pursues the daunting challenge of fundamentally
reconstituting (or reviving) the meaning of criminal law in a
democratic society. As the title suggests, Dubber worries
about how victims have been exploited by America's
longstanding war on crime. But he likewise deplores the
way that war has undermined the criminal process,
distorting the reality of crime for both victims and
offenders, to the benefit of the state." Instead of focusing on
victims' rights, or on offenders' rights-for that matter,
Dubber advocates what he calls the law and rights of
persons.
Victims in the War on Crime is divided into two parts,
"The War on Victimless Crime" and "Vindicating Victims'
Rights." Indeed, the two parts could have been separate
books unto themselves, the first describing how the war on
crime has distorted criminal law-in practice-almost
beyond recognition, and the second describing how a new
conceptualization of victims' rights could promote victim
interests far better than existing initiatives. Fortunately,
and essentially, Dubber connects the two parts, although
perhaps more implicitly than explicitly in some cases.
Disentangling victims and the victims' rights movement
from the war on crime has everything to do with vindicating
victims' rights for their own sake and for salvaging a
legitimate American criminal law after the war dies down.
11. Dubber's publisher, New York University Press, promotes VICTIMS IN
THE WAR ON CRIME as "the first book to provide a critical analysis of the role of
victims in the criminal justice system as a whole." While Dubber makes a
crucial and substantial contribution to that analysis, his book is hardly the first
critique, and perhaps could have benefited from building more on that previous
research. See SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME: A POLICY
GUIDE (1985); Ezzat A. Fattah, Prologue: On Some Visible and Hidden Dangers
of Victim Movements, in FROM CRIME POLICY To VICTIM POLICY: REORIENTING
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1-14 (Ezzat A. Fattah, ed., 1986); SANDRA WALKLATE,
VICTIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (1989); VICTIMS
STILL, supra note 2; R.I. MAWBY & S. WALKLATE, CRITICAL VICTIMOLOGY (1994);
Robert Elias, Has Victimology Outlived Its Usefulness? 6 J. OF HUMAN JUSTICE
4-25 (1994) [hereinafter Has Victimology Outlived Its Usefulness?]; LESLIE
SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996);
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Movement, 1985
UTAH L.Aw REV. 517 (1985); ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION:
VICTIMS, VICTIMOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1986); Lynne N. Henderson, The
Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937-944 (1985) (which Dubber does
cite).
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I. WAGING THE WAR ON CRIME
In Chapter One, Dubber condemns the U.S. war on
crime, especially the cycle of that war that has occurred
since the early 1980s. The war, he argues, has continued
even though it has shown no connection to the curbing of
criminal violence." More important, for Dubber's purposes,
the war has provided the efficient disposal of millions of
undesirables mostly for offenses with no victims
whatsoever. The war on crime has enlisted victims, and
most notably the victims' movement, in a campaign that
has not only not prevented crime, it has done nothing for
victims' rights, in part because it has no victims other than
the state itself.
According to Dubber, this constitutes the end of the
criminal law since it is no more about crime than it is about
law. Crimes, as serious violations of another person's rights,
are incidental. And the law, as a state-run system of conflict
resolution, is also irrelevant since under contemporary
criminal law practice, persons matter neither as the source
or the target of threats. Policing is merely a matter between
the threats and the state. The objective is to eradicate the
threats-especially those against the state.
Rather than on interpersonal violence, U.S. criminal
law focuses mainly on possession offenses and nuisance
control. It constitutes a campaign to incapacitate human
hazards, based on their perceived dangerousness, not so
much to the community as to the state. Possession offenses,
Dubber argues, have replaced vagrancy as the "sweep" or
12. Some have celebrated the recent downturn in crime in the U.S., and
attributed it to the war on crime. But the evidence suggests otherwise. Crime
had already begun to decline before the most draconian effects of the war had
been put into operation, and thus the causal link seems to be missing. A more
plausible explanation for the downturn may be demographic since it
corresponds to a drop off in the people (young males) who have traditionally
perpetrated most of the nation's criminal violence. When that population begins
to increase (and there are signs that it has already begun), then violence will
likely escalate again (as it has already in some parts of the country). For more
on this, see ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY (2000). Dubber and
others would argue that the massive incapacitation accomplished by the war on
crime will not likely prevent a new upsurge in violent crime not only because
the society (unchanged) will continue, as in the past, to generate new, not-yet-
incarcerated, offenders from among the next wave of baby boomers but also
because the current incapacitation has been primarily warehousing nonviolent,
rather than violent, offenders.
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social control offense of choice. But unlike vagrancy,
possession convictions provide far more than a slap on the
wrist. 3 And even though their enforcement (and even
existence) violates a series of constitutional protections,
possession charges are-in practice-substantially insu-
lated against constitutional challenges.
The war on crime is, in theory, preventative since it
focuses on the purported threat rather than on the
occurrence of actual harm. Thus, we punish for what
someone might do rather than for what has actually been
done. Dubber claims that this switch (or distortion, as he
calls it) in the criminal law was, ironically, promoted by a
prevailing "treatmentism" in American penology. The other
side of the coin from the benign rehabilitation perspective
(that briefly reigned in the late 1960s and early 1970s) is an
unsavory incapacitation perspective. In the former,
treatment is applied after the crime; in the latter,
treatment is applied before the crime (based on a prediction
that a crime will be committed)-except the treatment is
now merely punishment and incapacitation.
Dubber argues that the war on crime has three
functions: preventative, communitarian, and authoritarian.
Its preventative function purportedly stops violent crime by
taking criminal predators off the streets. It incapacitates
not so much offenders who have committed violent crimes
but primarily people who have been labeled as dangerous.
It is an interventionist regime that feels compelled to act at
the earliest possible time, even if no real evidence or actual
or likely violence is shown. An increasing number of
criminal offenses is employed, whose commission or even
attempt, is taken as a sign of dangerousness, and a need to
remove the offender from society. Most of those offenses are
matters of possession, such as the assumed dangerousness
attributed to people who are caught with illegal drugs. Not
merely criminals but virtually everyone now possesses at
least one of the growing list of items that now constitute the
so-called instruments of crime, including screw drivers, ski
13. While Dubber admirably examines the history of vagrancy enforcement
as a social control mechanism, if he had gone a bit further back in history, he
would have discovered that vagrancy convictions had, at one time, also carried
very severe sanctions, including torture, mutilation and even the death penalty.
See WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER (2d
ed. 1982).
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hats, and baseball bats. 4  An increasing number of
presumptions about one's disposition toward violent crime
accompanies the proliferating list of potential weapons.
Police officers wonder, "Why were you carrying that screw
driver?" and "Given what you possess, can you give a
satisfactory accounting of yourself?"
Aside from possession offenses, a flood of new, abstract
endangerment offenses has emerged, such as reckless
endangerment and traffic offenses. Speeding might be
neutralized as a source of danger by a simple fine. But
under the new regime of American criminal law, it might
instead require incapacitation. This can easily occur, given
the rapidly eroding constitutional protections of privacy,
and a speeding stop can easily escalate into a body and auto
search, and a lengthy prison term for a possession offense.
As Dubber argues, policing-as a result-focuses on ever
less and less concrete evidence of actual dangerousness. In
theory, almost anything can be dangerous, and thus provide
the grounds for incapacitation.
The war on crime has a second, communitarian
function, whereby the criminal serves as a convenient focus
for uniting an otherwise disparate and divided
community-a revealing description of contemporary
American society. The object of community hatred must
first be driven from the community. Offenders must be
incapacitated because they are presumed incurable or
genetically disposed toward crime, or because they are by
nature evil or black or Latino or poor or have a low IQ, and
so forth. The community cannot share responsibility for the
offender's act (if indeed, the offender has even acted) but
instead must be distanced from the offenders. In practice,
this separation does not primarily divide real offenders
from real victims but almost always divides instead along
class and race lines, with the white middle class as the
14. The baseball bat-that essential tool of our national pastime and icon of
millions of American childhoods, has been indicted for its connection to violence.
Will widespread bans on the baseball bat be next? See Bob Klein, Three Strikes,
You're Out-The Baseball Bat and Violence, or What Have They Done to My
Louisville Slugger? 8 NINE: THE JOURNAL OF BASEBALL HISTORY AND CULTURE
46-58 (1999). Other illegal possessions include toy guns, air pistols, appliances,
body vests, drugs and drug paraphernalia, graffiti instruments, computer-
related material, embossing machines, recordings, vehicle titles, obscene
material, gambling records, inside information, and even undersized catfish.
VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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protected, innocent community and with the (especially
black) lower class as the offenders. 5
The war on crime's final function is authoritarian. The
prevailing criminal process, Dubber claims, has almost
nothing to do with protecting victims from violence or with
protecting victims' rights--despite the impressive victims'
rights laws on the books. Instead, "society" is the victim,
whose interests must be protected against antisocial
conduct. The individual interests of victims are of no
interest, and actual victims are treated as mere nuisances.
But society as victim does not even represent the abstract,
broader community. Instead, the interests of the society are
actually the narrow interests of the state, its officials, and
the nation's ruling elements.
To secure these interests, which seek to protect the
state against perceived threats, officials pursue an
authoritarian regime that increasingly resembles a police
state. Offenses are defined to minimize inconvenient proof
requirements, and guilt or blameworthiness as a standard
is abandoned, thus eliminating time wasted on defenses
claiming ignorance, insanity, mistake, duress, or
entrapment. The jury is largely dropped in favor of bench
trials; and most trials are abandoned altogether in favor of
plea-bargaining-anything that streamlines administrative
control and processing. Enforcement is focused mainly on
so-called public welfare offenses such as drugs, liquor,
weapons, traffic, nuisance, and motor vehicle violations. In
sum, criminal justice has become the enforcement of
obedience to state commands, and an assertion of state
authority as the sole and proper guardian of the common
good. That "good" has nothing to do with interpersonal
crime, and everything to do with promoting and protecting
state power and control.
II. POLICING POSSESSION
In Chapter Two, Dubber describes, in brilliant detail,
how possession offenses have come to dominate law
15. This is despite the fact, as Dubber points out, that most victims of
violent crime are poor blacks. Most middle class whites do not face the prospect
of crime but rather the abstract threat of crime. They need to be protected not
from crime but rather from the fear of crime. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME,
supra note 10, at 26.
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enforcement. With so many items criminalized, nearly
every person has one. This and the eroding restrictions on
police searches, make possession offenses ideal for police
sweeps. Police have become the accepted experts for
diagnosing bulges or other signs that something illegal is
possessed. If an illegal item is discovered while pursuing
another crime, then it may be useful if no evidence for a
crime is found or if it does not stick. Possession charges
prevent the state from having to prove any other crime, and
they are routinely added on top of any other charges.16
Possession charges save prosecutors the trouble of
having to prove mens rea (guilty mind). As such, they
constitute "strict liability" crimes-mere possession is
sufficient. Such charges also eliminate the traditional
requirement of actus rea (engaging in an affirmative act or
at least a failure to act), and instead punish based on a
status (being in possession of something). Culpability and
responsibility defenses have no role in possession cases.
Likewise, the "agency" defense cannot be used, and thus
one need not prove that the defendant was aware that he
possessed something illegal. In possession cases, Dubber
argues, the principal has switched from the possessor to the
object she possesses. The purported dangerousness of the
object passes to the possessor, thus enabling her to be
labeled as dangerous even if she has done nothing
dangerous. No distinctions are made between purposeful
acts, knowledgeable (but not intentional) acts, reckless acts,
or negligent acts. Mere possession assumes the worst
(purposeful act). This undermines the standards underlying
a democratic criminal law.
Related to possession offenses, the war on crime has
also escalated the law of forfeiture, or the seizure of objects
that are considered dangerous by definition. Anything that
can be possibly connected to an illegal possession or act can
be taken (such as a family car that transported a
prostitute), and the possessor can be automatically
criminalized. Dangerous humans have been targeted and
labeled by what they possess and-like dangerous dogs-
16. As Dubber shows, defendants who are acquitted of crimes such as
burglary are often convicted, nevertheless, and receive heavy sentences
(including as much as life imprisonment without parole) on possession charges
(such as for stolen property-never mind how the defendant received it or
whether he knew it was stolen). New York State has at least 115 felony
possession offenses on its books.
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they are then subject to public control. Correctible human
"hazards" are given rehabilitation but most are deemed
incorrigible, and instead given long if not life sentences,
or-like a dangerous dog-they are executed. New York
canine statutes provide at least four defenses against
sanctions for dangerous dogs. According to Dubber, those
defenses are more generous than the New York criminal
code provides for so-called dangerous humans.17
Simply getting into your car allows police an intense
scrutiny of your person, your life, and your possessions.
Traffic stops, Dubber argues, are not used primarily to
sanction traffic violations but rather to identify and
eliminate threats. The Supreme Court has accommodated
law enforcement by repeatedly loosening constitutional
restrictions. It began when police were allowed to detain
suspects without probable cause. Soon, officers were
assuming that virtually everyone was harboring a weapon
that would warrant a search and also a confiscation of all
possessions. Then, police were allowed to stop cars without
suspicion of any kind-not reasonable suspicion, not
probable cause-as long as the stop qualified as a
"roadblock" to check for things such as driver's licenses,
auto registrations, illegal aliens, or DWIs. The "plain view"
rule further unleashed the police, and it does not matter
whether police inadvertently or intentionally stop people for
"fishing expeditions." Police sweeps are not limited to the
suspected crime that was supposed to have justified the
warrant in the first place; instead, anything can be seized
as evidence of illegal possession.
Consensual searches cast the net even wider for illegal
possessions. Police are not required to tell people that they
can say no to a search request. Even when people know
they can say no, many will not since they know it will
automatically put them under suspicion. The mentality is:
"What do you have to hide?" Of course, the answer is:
"Nothing but my privacy."
The vast majority of search and seizure cases are
possession cases where no crimes occurred except that
something that had been defined as criminal (as compared
to being criminally harmful) was in someone's possession."1
17. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 45.
18. Aside from items that have been defined as criminal because of their
purported dangerousness (see supra note 14), dozens of other things have been
2004] 235
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In most of the Supreme Court cases involving constitutional
rights for defendants, possession was the sole or shared
issue."
Possession charges are made more powerful when
combined with conspiracy charges. Long used in the U.S.
against political agitators, conspiracy now applies more
broadly. Like possession, conspiracy inflicts no harm in
itself, and the standards of proof are extremely loose, thus
allowing people far from any crime or potential crime to be
nevertheless linked to it. Conspiracy, combined with
possession, enforcement has prompted the rise of profiles in
law enforcement, including racial profiling (which can
encompass an entire group of people, such as African
Americans). First, the "threatening" group is targeted and
then the things the group possesses are criminalized (or
made far more criminal than other, similar things
possessed by other groups) so that members of that group
can be regularly pursued for those possessions, and thus
criminalized.2"
Increasingly, state and federal prosecutions are
coordinated. Since double jeopardy has not acted to prevent
repeat prosecutions, a multiplier effect has taken hold. For
example, gun possession, which might produce only a five-
year sentence, can in practice produce a much longer
sentence, since it can be linked to each count of a drug
charge arising out of a single drug transaction. Federal
sentencing guidelines have been strongly pushed on the
states. They have promoted not only mandatory, but also
draconian, sentencing, including the elimination of parole.
This reflects a further distortion in the criminal law: a shift
from a law of crimes to a law of punishments, and from
conviction to sentencing.21
defined as criminal for other reasons, including draft cards, lottery slips, books,
records, cards, receipts, lists, pictures, recordings, ration coupons, stamps, and
food stamps. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10 at 63.
19. Id. at 56.
20. One is reminded of the more severe enforcement used against crack
cocaine (used primarily by less well off blacks) and the more lenient
enforcement against regular cocaine (used primarily by more well off whites).
See CLARENCE LUSANE, PIPE DREAM BLUES: RACISM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
(1991); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1996). For an examination of this process earlier in American history,
see TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS AND MORAL
JUDGMENT (1970) [hereinafter THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY].
21. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 69.
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Possession charges are also used to increase the
incapacitative effect of any given conviction.22 Someone
convicted of carjacking can be given a longer sentence
automatically for simply possessing a gun, even a legal gun.
The object possessed thus becomes a sentencing factor and
not merely an offense element for purposes of deciding
guilt.
In addition, possession may function as presumptive
evidence of another offense, including presumptions about
illegal acquisition and about intent to use. Thus, in
criminalizing possession, legislatures are often also
criminalizing import, manufacture and purchase, as well as
use, sale or export of items that are harmless in themselves.
Thus, possession essentially becomes any or all of these
things by definition, even without evidence.
As a means of social control, possession enforcement
has many advantages over the vagrancy enforcement it has
replaced. As Dubber suggests, possession is a private not a
public offense, and thus it warrants police intrusions into
the home, office, automobile, and so forth. The
criminalization of possessions presumptively criminalizes
everyone, everywhere. Victimless crimes, such as
possessing illegal drugs, do not escape the law simply by
being used in the home. Some laws even allow searches of
private homes for legal objects because the possessor is
deemed to be dangerous.
Compared to vagrancy, possession is also more final
and efficient. Vagrancy enforcement posed the choice
between leaving town or a short jail stay while possession
enforcement offers the choice between plea bargaining to a
five-year sentence or risking a life sentence before a jury.
Likewise, possession offenses are less susceptible to legal
challenges. Vagrancy laws often punished obviously
innocent conduct while with possession laws, punishment
can be inflicted without any conduct at all. According to
Dubber, possession offenses are highly efficient instruments
of oppression and discrimination that have been disguised
as conventional criminal offenses.
22. Id. at 70. In addition, inmates are essentially banned from possessing
anything in prison. Thus, there is always an easy means for finding a prisoner
in possession (of a toothbrush, a coat hanger, a radio antenna, and so forth),
and for using it to enhance her prison sentence.
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With the American Revolution, the U.S. purportedly
moved from a monarchy to a democracy. But instead of
completely eliminating the parental police power of the
king, it was instead taken over by the state. While its
effects have developed slowly, we are now feeling its full
repercussions. Such an approach to criminal law
undermines democracy, and exempts the state and its
officials from coverage and accountability. The only
relevant victim in contemporary criminal law is presumed
to be the innocent state, which cannot pose a threat, by
definition, no matter how dangerous the instruments they
possess or how prone its officials might be to violence, both
legal and physical. As Dubber argues, the state uses
possession offenses (as it used to use vagrancy offenses) to
draw a line in society. But, it is a boundary that gives the
state and its ruling elites all the protection, and not merely
against the old "dangerous classes" but potentially against
all others in society. Never mind new developments such
as the U.S.A. Patriot Act; we might already have more of a
police state than we imagine.
III. STATE NUISANCE CONTROL
The war on crime not only pursues victimless crimes. It
also promotes offenderless crimes. The crime label and
resulting enforcement attaches to any threat, and thus the
offender's personhood is irrelevant. There is no need to
worry about questions of guilt. Status is freely punished. In
Chapter Three, Dubber further examines possession
offenses, characterizing them as instruments of nuisance
control.
And the nuisances are not merely offenders. The war on
crime also has no room for victims-at least not individual
victims as persons. But the absence of a human victim has
not stopped the state from prosecuting. In fact, the presence
of a human victim is considered an impediment to
prosecution. Victims' rights initiatives only get in the
prosecutor's way, and most have been successfully resisted
by those who are purportedly the victims' best friends. Like
offenders, most victims are mere hindrances to the efficient
disposal of dangers.24
23. Id. at 96.
24. Id. at 100.
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Traditionally, possession enjoyed extensive protection
in U.S. law. Early courts even enforced a possessory
interest for wrongful possessions. Certainly, the adage that
"possession is nine-tenths of the law" had a long reign. It
was first watered down by the judicial invention of
''constructive possession," which claimed that some objects
could be in the custody of another person but still in the
possession of their rightful owner.
Possession protections were further undermined by
giving state officials wide authority to commit acts that
would be equivalent to larceny if committed by others. A
seizure of property is theft. Its forfeiture and resale
constitutes another crime. Entering a house is a trespass.
And so forth. The difference between police and private
individuals doing these things is that the former is
considered justified. While we take this for granted, the
justification is actually very thin, and usually amounts only
to confirming that the thief and trespasser is a duly
constituted official. Yet in nineteenth-century America, this
was not the presumption, and trespass actions against
police officers were common. Today, it is also assumed that
police can just destroy property (such as drugs or alcohol)
that has been defined as criminal yet a century ago that
would have been a violation of the sanctity of private
property. A concern about the policing of contraband has
completely disappeared.
How did we get into this situation? Dubber develops a
provocative answer. He claims that it is the legacy of how
we have responded to drugs. In America, we have perceived
(at least some of) them to be dangerous, and possessed by
dangerous outsiders. Against this a depersonalized criminal
law was devised as a kind of danger disposal. But more
specifically, Dubber argues, it all boils down to opium,
Chinese immigrants and the war on crime.
As Dubber tells the story, there were early attempts to
use gun possession to police blacks. But possession offenses
began in earnest in western U.S. states, when they decided
to police two serious threats to the community: opium and
the Chinese. Opium, unlike alcohol, was viewed as
dangerous, per se, and the people who possessed it were
regarded as different and more dangerous than Americans.
Dangerous Chinese had to be prevented from using
dangerous opium since it would ruin the (alcohol-drinking)
American community. The perceived dangerousness of
2392004]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
opium was derived mainly from the perceived dan-
gerousness of those who possessed it. Some courts even
admitted that smoking opium was not really a vice and that
the real reason for sanctioning it was to "vex and annoy the
'Heathen Chinee."' '2 Conviction meant imprisonment unless
the state decided to deport instead, which was even better.
Soon this trend engulfed the nation. Before long a ban on
Chinese immigration was imposed and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service was born.26
Under this policy, groups are treated as infected
merchandise, lacking in all rights. The issue is political not
criminal. Classes are rooted out as injurious to the state
because of who they are rather than for anything they have
done or will do. Eventually, the possession policy spread
from opium to other "dangerous" drugs, and from the
Chinese to other dangerous groups.27 Ultimately, most of
the American public has now become potentially a member
of a giant dangerous group. The public, whose welfare was
supposed to be protected by the state from threats is now
viewed by that state as the real threat-against whom the
state itself needs protection.8
Left without personal victims, the essence of a
possession offense is that it amounts to disobedience to
state authority-that is the crime. Policing purports to
eliminate threats. But threats to what? In the end, the
answer is the state. The state is the victim, by definition.
State officials are granted special protections, not only for
their behavior but also for how seriously their victimization
is treated compared to everyone else's. Thus, the murder of
a police officer is a more serious offense than of a civilian.
Acts of disobedience toward state officials have been
extensively criminalized, such as contempt, disorderliness,
and sanctions for non-cooperation. Everything is arranged
for the convenience and efficiency of state officials, and only
submissive behavior prevents the state from throwing its
full weight against you. Plea-bargaining reflects the
fundamental inequality of power between the defendant
and the state. While it promotes efficiency, it rarely
25. Id. at 111.
26. Id. at 110-11.
27. Id. at 113-14. See also THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, supra note 20.
28. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 114.
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produces any bargain and typically amounts to an
unconditional surrender.29
The state's claim to victimhood is greatest, however, in
the campaign for victims' rights. Victims are twice
victimized, first by the perpetrator and then by the state
itself, whose officials treat the victim-at best-like a
nuisance rather than a person. The state, which occupies
the positions of both victimizer and vindicator, classifies
itself as the victim for whose benefit it is fighting the war
on crime. While not completely denying the existence of
individual victims, the state nevertheless views itself as the
real victim. As Dubber argues, personal victims and the
vindication of their rights play a minor, supporting role for
the one apersonal victim that really matters: the state.
While the war on crime represents the most
comprehensive imposition of apersonal criminal admin-
istration, the process began long before. For example, the
Model Penal Code, devised in 1962, expanded offenses as
well as sanctions. Offenders were treated as non-persons,
disposed toward committing crimes. The drafters were so
anxious to extinguish threats (rather than punish crimes)
that they sought not merely to prevent the infliction of
harm but also the mere threat of that infliction. The Code
focused on the offender's purported dangerousness and not
the likelihood or even the possibility of actually inflicting
harm. It also punished attempted crimes more harshly,
essentially as severely as the actual commission of those
crimes. The Code punished possession not so much as an
offense but rather as a theory of criminal liability or
diagnosis of dangerousness. No intent need be proved. The
mens rea standard was transformed from a means of
distinguishing criminal from non-criminal behavior to a
way of distinguishing levels of dangerousness (with
criminality already assumed). The Code also depersonalized
the victim. Social interests (embodied in the state) were
paramount over individual interests. Where the state is not
the victim, then victims are largely abstractions. Offenses
29. In theory, plea bargaining has been eliminated by victims' rights
legislation in some jurisdictions, such as California. In practice, however, it still
flourishes as the main means of processing criminal cases. See CANDACE MCCOY,
POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1993).
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against family members, for example, were offenses against
the family and not against the individual members."
But the war on crime makes the criminal law even
more irrelevant to offenders, victims and the public than
the Model Penal Code. The war emphasizes the permanent
disposal of offenders. It shifts the. presumptions from
corrigible to incorrigible, and from rehabilitation to
incapacitation. Juries are largely marginalized, except to
legitimize state objectives.3' Prisons are transformed from
correctional institutions to warehouses. Possession offenses
are converted from opportunities for early intervention into
opportunities for lengthy if not permanent imprisonment.
Parole is abandoned and the death penalty is promoted.32
None of this has anything to do with serving victim
interests.
IV. THE LEGITIMATE CORE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
Chapter Four launches the second half of Victims in the
War on Crime, and it seeks to vindicate victims' rights. But
what are the victims' genuine interests? Dubber begins by
observing that criminal law in a democracy is not supposed
to ensure obedience to the state so that it can protect itself
or abstract public interests. Crimes are not supposed to be
disturbances of the state's peace but rather interferences
with the rights of persons. The essence of crime is not the
violation of one's duty of loyalty and obedience to the
sovereign but rather the violation of one person's autonomy
by another, equal person.
Dubber argues that we must view criminal law through
the perspective of victims as persons. When we do so, the
state is marginalized (into its proper place), and
30. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 140-42.
31. Under the requirement that a defendant must be tried by a jury of his
peers, the jury is supposed to represent the defendant's community. Instead, in
practice, in order to qualify for a jury not only must one not be an offender but
one must also identify with victims. Thus, when jury trials happen at all, they
almost always affirm the state's interest in not only conviction but also the most
severe incarceration possible. Id. at 166.
32. See ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1998); WILLIAM
J. CHAMBLISS, POWER, POLITICS AND CRIME (2001); JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL
PRISONER MACHINE (2000); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDowN AMERICA (1999);
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS
PUBLIC POLICY (David Shichor & Dale Sechrest eds., 1996).
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distinctions between offenders and victims fall away. The
law of offenderhood and the law of victimhood are both
aspects of what Dubber calls the "law of personhood." As
persons, both offenders and victims must be protected
against oppression in a state-centered system. In a
democracy, there is only one legitimate government: self-
government. The primary function of the state is to protect
the autonomy of the persons who comprise it. The criminal
law should vindicate individual rights, for both offenders
and victims.
Since victimhood and offenderhood, and victim and
offender labels, are inconsistent with a capacity for
autonomy, they should be viewed only as temporary
descriptions. Claiming rights for victims as victims is
detrimental to victims, according to Dubber. And tying
benefits to victimhood only prolongs one's victimization and
passivity. Victimological essentialism (that victims are born
victims and share common characteristics) is the flip side of
criminal essentialism. These assumptions are detrimental
to both victims and offenders, and ignore the evidence that
victims and offenders are often very much alike.
Historically, the victim's role in criminal law has been
challenged the most by notions that crime is an offense
against the state instead of against individuals. But the
state's preoccupation with victimless (rather than
"victimful" crimes) has done the most damage. The host of
victims' rights provisions (such as the pending Victims'
Rights Amendment) are typically toothless, and promoted
largely for symbolic purposes.3 Victims now enjoy rights
long held by criminal defendants, but they are as useless to
victims as they have been to defendants. Most of the rights
supposedly gained are unenforceable and denied in practice.
Much attention has been given to victim impact statements.
But aside from their questionable legitimacy, they have had
only a minimal effect. 4
Dubber takes particular aim at the victims' rights
movement. While he credits it for some accomplishments,
he views the movement as primarily counterproductive for
33. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 157; see also VICTIMS
STILL, supra note 2.
34. Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Victim Impact Statements and
Victim Satisfaction: An Unfulfilled Promise? 22 J. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1
(1994).
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victims. The victims' movement gets us to identify with
victims, but as victims rather than as persons. It has helped
the state use the criminal law as nuisance control and
helped it conduct a war on (purported) criminals (but not on
crime). The victims' movement has been successful largely
because it has associated itself (and been co-opted by) the
war on crime. But the success has been largely symbolic.
The interests of real victims have rarely been served, and
often have been further harmed.
According to Dubber, the image of victims in the
victims' movement is one of helpless and vengeful
individuals. 5 This plays nicely into the war on crime,
exploiting victims for state interests. 6 Active and strong
victims are an impediment to officials while helpless
victims are malleable and grateful. The victims' movement,
Dubber argues, prefers cries for help and simplistic
solutions (such as extreme punishment) instead of confident
explorations by victims of the meaning of their
victimization and the healthiest response. The victims'
movement thereby helps preserve victimhood, thus
undermining the victim's personhood. In a criminal process
designed to vindicate autonomy, a helpless victim has no
place. A state response should come only if a genuine victim
requires it. Unless there is a harm to a person's autonomy,
there is no need to fix it. But criminal law under the war on
crime does everything but respect the victim's autonomy.3 7
Dubber indicts the victims' movement for marginalizing
race and the women's movement. Victims of hate crime, for
example, should fit the victims' movement's definition of
victimization, yet they have not been embraced for the same
reason these crimes are committed in the first place: race.
The typical victim of an actual violent crime is black yet the
35. Despite being encouraged to believe that vengeance will salve their
victimization, there is no convincing evidence that most victims-on their
own-want revenge. See VICTIMS STILL, supra note 2; Steve Baker, Justice Not
Revenge: A Crime Victim's Perspective on Capital Punishment, 40 UCLA L. REV.
339 (1992); ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS (2004). To the contrary, some
victim groups (such as Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation) specifically
reject it.
36. The state accepts victim testimony that might enhance sentences but
not generally testimony that might reduce them, including opposition to the
death penalty.
37. A prosecutor may pursue a case even if the victim argues against it,
since crime is viewed as an attack against the abstract state. VICTIMS IN THE
WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 196.
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* typical victims' movement victim is white. The victims'
movement had no trouble, Dubber argues, with the racist
(and war-on-crime inspired) Willie Horton ads of the early
1990s. In fact, the victims' movement is dominated by
whites at all levels.
Likewise, while the women's movement had an early
influence on the victims' movement, feminists were quickly
pushed aside and women's issues have been submerged into
the broader, conservative war on crime. As Dubber points
out, the first person prosecuted under the Violence Against
Women Act (which was originally inspired by misogynistic
crimes by men against women) was a woman, since the
final language focused on "gender" rather than "women."
In contrast, the victims' movement strongly emphasizes
murder. Yet this is both the most serious and also the most
"victimless" of crimes. On the face of it, murder leaves no
victim behind. The victims' movement focuses on the
murder (and assault) of children, in particular. As a result,
a series of highly politicized new laws have emerged, named
for the victims who inspired them. Perhaps the most
prominent has been Polly Klaas. But we also have Megan's
Law, Jenna's Law, Kendra's Law, Elisa's Law, Kieran's
Law, and Jeremy and Julia's Law. In the (usual) absence of
a direct victim, the relatives act as victims by proxy.
Sometimes the victims' movement more closely resembles a
relatives-of-victims' movement. These cases have launched
a series of public, and even political, careers, almost always
obsessed with conservative, law and order perspectives and
a strong endorsement of the war on crime."
Dubber argues that the more we focus on the victim for
the sake of disrespecting the offender, the less we respect
the victim as her own person, while disrespecting the
offender at the same time. This may sound strange to those
who automatically think the worst about the accused. But
Dubber believes we must discard the concepts of victim and
offender in deference to persons. Offenders might be
punished but their rights and personhood must be
38. For example, Mark Klaas became the head of the high-profile Polly
Klaas Foundation after the murder of his daughter. John Walsh became a
national celebrity with his America's Most Wanted television program after the
murder of his son. Under the theory that armed citizens can best prevent crime,
Suzanna Hupp formed the Second Amendment Sisters, after her parents were
murdered, to counter-demonstrate against the Million Mom March, which
sought greater gun control. Id. at 187.
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respected. When defendants' rights are abandoned and
punishments are increased, it is not victims who win but
rather only the state.
The criminal process should vindicate the victim's
autonomy. The offender's oppression of the victim, by
imposing his autonomy over another, should be viewed as
an attempt to interfere with the victim's autonomy. The
victim's personhood must remain intact throughout the
process, and that may or may not be served by punishment.
In contrast, the victims' movement seems to insist on
punishments-the harsher the better. Victim impact
evidence, Dubber argues, is not about victims but rather
about the venting of powerful emotions that have no outlet
in the criminal process. Allowing, if not encouraging, a
victim to voice his hatred of the offender has nothing to do
with which punishment is appropriate. Nor does it
vindicate the victim's autonomy. Instead, it resembles what
psychologists would call "acting out," which does nothing to
process the victimization and likely makes it worse.
Allowing relatives to vent their hatred further
marginalizes the victim and shifts the focus to others, thus
losing the victim. Capital cases, Dubber claims, have
nothing to do with victims' rights since there is no victim.
Yet victim impact evidence is emphasized in those cases the
most. This might seem surprising until we realize that
capital punishment itself has nothing to do with victims'
rights.
Victim impact testimony also undermines the offender's
personhood. Rather than as a person endowed with the
capacity for autonomy, the prosecutor portrays the offender
as a non-person driven by an inherently criminal nature,
who must be exterminated rather than merely punished.
According to Dubber, the use of victim testimony (in a real
democracy) is so illegitimate toward this end that no gain in
the vindication of the victim's autonomy could warrant it,
no matter how substantial that gain might be. In this case,
Dubber argues, there is no gain whatsoever.4"
39. Id. at 207.
40. Id. at 209.
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V. VINDICATING VICTIMS
In Chapter 5, Dubber seeks to more specifically salvage
something useful from the victims' movement. While it
seems content, in practice, to sign on to the war on crime's
emphasis on victimless crimes, in theory the victims'
movement is most concerned with violent crime. Such an
emphasis can help us revive a legitimate meaning for crime
and the criminal law. But most helpful, from Dubber's
perspective, is the neglected law of victim compensation.
In contrast to most victims' rights initiatives, victim
compensation schemes offer a measurable benefit, directly
from the state.41 In contrast to the offender's punishment,
Dubber implies that compensation is most likely the most
appropriate response on behalf of the victim. Begun before
the latest law and order crusade, compensation programs
have emerged less tainted by the war on crime. Compared
to other victim legislation, compensation plans narrow the
definition of eligible victims. This may reflect the state's
reluctance to pay, but it has the positive effect of confining
itself largely to the harms that legitimately belong in the
criminal law: crimes with actual and serious victims, and
crimes committed by persons against other persons."
Victim compensation law excludes the offender. It
uncouples compensation from punishment but it takes it too
far, implying that there is no need for an offender in the
first place. Without him, the question of victims' rights
loses its urgency. When the law eliminates the offender, it
gives victims all the attention but undermines the reason
for paying attention in the first place. To a victim, it makes
a big difference whether the harm was inflicted by an
offender rather than a tree or a dog. The offender's
personhood is not merely a matter for an offender-based
41. Dubber may be exaggerating the concrete benefits of victim
compensation programs since they, too, have often delivered more symbolic
benefits than concrete payments. See VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM, supra note 10;
SUSAN KISS SARNOFF, PAYING FOR CRIME (1996).
42. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 219-22. Dubber
emphasizes the importance of excluding non-human entities such as
corporations and the state. By so advocating, he doesn't seek leniency against
corporate or state harms but rather only argues that they should have no
rights, and no claim to be victims. (On the other hand, he is not very specific on
how those harms should be confronted.) Dubber claims, more specifically, that
recognizing the state as a victim would create a criminal law in which the
vindication of personal rights has no place.
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law of punishment. It also matters to a victim-based law of
compensation. The personal nature of the offender
distinguishes the experience of criminal victimization from
other types of harm. By limiting crime to personal
offenders, the personhood of victims is respected. Despite
excluding the offender, compensation law has the value of
focusing on intentionality, thus distinguishing crime
victims from accident victims. In other words, while the
criminal law has steadily discarded standards such as
criminal intent, compensation law could help us restore
them.
Since compensation requires intent, compensation
programs generally do not cover negligent crimes. Dubber
sees a lesson here. From his perspective, negligent crimes
do not represent an attempt by one person to subjugate
another. While the punishment of intentional crimes
reaffirms the victim's autonomy, the punishment of
negligent crimes threatens to violate, rather than vindicate,
victims' rights since it obscures the proper function of the
criminal law: reaffirming the victim's autonomy. The more
that crimes of negligence, crimes of strict liability (status
and possession offenses), and victimless crimes are handled
by law enforcement, the more true crimes will be
marginalized-to the extent that the real point of the
criminal law will be lost. It should be not about punishment
or about victims but rather about vindicating the
personhood of victims and offenders. While it has its
limitations, compensation law embodies the best
conceptualization of victimhood, and could help us better
conceptualize offenderhood, as well.
VI. THE LAW OF VICTIMHOOD AND OFFENDERHOOD
Dubber continues this theme into Chapter Six.
Compensation law, he argues, does not classify acts (of
crime) but rather reflects the state's duty to protect its
people from the consequences of criminal acts. 3 Having
established the relevance of the offender's personhood in
victim compensation law, he seeks to establish the victim's
place in the offender-based law of punishment.
According to Dubber, victims must be granted the
ability to consent to an act against them. If they do consent,
43. Id. at 249.
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then no crime has occurred. If we fail to recognize consent
as a defense, then we violate victims' rights, and
particularly their right to autonomy. It would also violate
the offender's right to autonomy. The victim's personhood is
not only a prerequisite for the offender's punishment (and
for the victim's compensation). It can also work to exculpate
the offender, provided he acted with the victim's consent.
A criminal law that puts persons first, rather than acts,
should consider personhood first. In practice, however, the
criminal law considers the act first, and usually not the
personhood at all. Personhood is the common denominator
that links the law of compensation with the law of
punishment. Radically distinguishing the offender and the
victim is politically expedient yet it violates the
fundamentals of modern democracy: that all people are
equal. Making this distinction is not only illegitimate, it is
also sociologically inaccurate: victims and offenders usually
come from the same backgrounds, and frequently have
found themselves in their mirror opposite role.
The proper distinction should be made between persons
(including both victims and offenders) and the state. By
abandoning the artificial distinction between offenders and
victims, the victims' movement will lose political
significance unless, of course, it resurrects itself as a
persons' rights movement, where the new foe is not the
offender but rather the state. But that would be a much
different politics than the movement practices now."
The criminal law would be wise to follow victim
compensation's lead and narrow itself to serious crimes
only. We need to be more precise and selective about what
makes people crime victims as compared to the sufferers of
other harm. Instead of overcriminalization (of mostly
victimless offenses), crime should be limited to those things
that seriously undermine the victim's personhood and
autonomy. Threats should be included only if they produce
an actual harm, not merely a theoretical one. In the end,
what matters most is the victim's experience: whether the
threat caused the victim to suffer.
Aside from excluding negligence, status and other
victimless offenses, Dubber would also remove "attempts"
from the criminal law. What is the actual harm, he asks?
44. See VICTIMS STILL, supra note 2; See also Has Victimology Outlived Its
Usefulness?, supra note 11.
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Punishing attempts works for our current system, since it
assigns punitive treatment on the basis of symptoms. But a
legitimate theory of punishment (for harms) would find it
hard to justify the punishment of attempts, which are at
best crimes without victims. There is no victim perspective
in the law of attempts since there is no victim.
Contemporary criminal law is unclear on its theory of
harm. Yet the number of criminal offenses continues to
grow. Drunk driving, for example, is defined as a crime
even though it does not require the threat or actual
infliction of harm upon anyone. Such a crime excludes
victims. In reality, victims of drunk driving are the victims
of accidents not victims of crime. But drunk driving laws
are not aimed at drunk driving as much as against drunk
drivers. According to Dubber, the law transforms a
harmless offense into a serious one."
By linking the law of compensation to the law of
punishment, Dubber argues that a victim-claimant
(offender-defendant) should be conceptualized as a person
who suffers (inflicts) personal physical injury as a direct
result of crime. She has been determined to be a person,
and therefore capable of victimhood (offenderhood), and she
has suffered (inflicted) personal physical injury. To be
compensable (punishable), she must also be innocent
(guilty), not be (be) responsible for the crime, capable of
innocence (guilt), and also actually be innocent (guilty).
The only difference between the victim-claimant and
the offender-defendant when it comes to the final issue of
guilt and innocence, or ultimate responsibility, is this: one
45. It may be jolting to contemplate Dubber's notion that drunk driving is,
in itself, harmless. But this only suggests how quickly concepts of crime can be
transformed in the public's imagination, since we now consider DWIs as
criminal regardless whether they cause any harm. But the situation is even
more intriguing than that. According to the Center for Auto Safety in
Washington, D.C., far more automobile accidents, injuries and deaths are
caused by cell phones, sleep deprivation, and shoddy auto manufacturing than
by DWIs. Why then, hasn't the criminal law been directed toward the
corporations that make our cars? (Perhaps we will soon see laws that
criminalize cell phones and sleepyheads?) In addition, the crusade to make
DWIs criminal was led by MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving). Yet Candy
Lightner, MADD's founder, has abandoned the group, arguing that, in its
missionary zeal for punishment, MADD has lost its direction and does victims a
disservice. As Lighter has argued: "MADD helps you deal with anger ... but I
think it really prolongs denial." Katherine Griffin, No Longer MADD, THIS
WORLD (August 7, 1994) at 8.
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pursues the label of victim and the other seeks to avoid the
label of offender. In practice, however, this is instead
portrayed as a struggle between good and evil. In
compensation law, many victims are excluded because they
are not pure enough (such as when they are former
criminals). But these explorations of "goodness," Dubber
argues, are frightening, arbitrary, and focus
inappropriately on the people rather than on their acts.
In the end, it must be determined how much
compensation or punishment to mete out. As for
punishment, whole categories of persons have been
earmarked for extra punishment because of who they are
(past offenders, vice offenders, and so forth) rather than for
what they have done. Sentencing law is offense-focused
when it comes to denying sentencing reduction for minor
offenders but offender-focused when it comes to justifying
sentence enhancements for major offenders.
Instead, argues Dubber, granting nominal punishment
and nominal compensation would minimize the threat that
the process of punishment, and compensation, will harm,
rather than affirm, the autonomy of the offender and victim
alike:
Just as excessive punishment, inflicted under
oppressive conditions, may well do permanent damage
to the offender's sense of autonomy, so too excessive
compensation, paid out in a way that overemphasizes
the victim's 'neediness,' may cement the victim's
perception of himself as a perpetual victim, incapable of
managing his own affairs.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Dubber sums it up this way: "As a matter of
fact, the vindication of victims' rights has everything to do
with the war on crime. As a matter of principle, the
vindication of victims' rights has nothing to do with the war
on crime.""7 Victims have the right not to be treated as a
nuisance, and they deserve respect from the state and the
offender alike. Some nominal victims of crime have no need
for state assistance to regain their sense of autonomy after
46. VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 10, at 333.
47. Id. at 335.
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a crime. Others might need resources to recover their
medical, psychological, or fiscal health.
The very idea of a victims' bill of rights, according to
Dubber, flies in the face of the fact that victims enjoy rights
as persons not as victims. Rather than establish rights for
victims, victims' bills of rights ingrain their essential
victimhood. Contrary to the common assumptions, not
every opportunity for victim participation is appropriate:"
only those that strengthen the victim's sense of herself
rather than discourage her from reassembling herself.
Victim impact statements may encourage victims to define
themselves in terms of their victimization and thus reaffirm
offenders' control over them. In the end, the trial ends up
reenacting the crime rather than processing it.
Instead, victim impact statements should be used more
judiciously, to remind the state that crime is a matter of an
individual's victimization, to encourage the offender to
identify with the victim's suffering, and to encourage the
victim to evaluate the need for further punishment. What
will such punishment accomplish and for whom? Was the
process itself sufficient punishment? Testimony should be
limited to direct victims, and submitted as written, rather
than live, testimony.
Taking victims seriously means not only respecting
their autonomy in the criminal process but also drastically
reducing the scope of the criminal law; that is, the class of
cases that might qualify for criminal processing. The law of
victimhood already proceeds from a notion of crime as an
act of violence perpetrated by one person against another.
The law of offenderhood should do the same. Only the
attempt by one person to negate the autonomy of another
should be included. Other types of victimhood do not
require a restoration of autonomy and therefore should not
involve either the state or its criminal law.
Only an offender-focused system of law would confuse
the criminal law with the law of offenderhood and ignore
the law of victimhood. From the victim's perspective,
48. Deborah P. Kelly & Edna Erez, Victim Participation in the Criminal
Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 231-44 (Robert C. Davis, et al. eds., 1997);
Barbara E. Smith & Susan W. Hillenbrand, Making Victims Whole Again, in
VICTIMS OF CRIME 245-56 (Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 1997); KATHERINE
BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA (2000); LESLIE W. KENNEDY & VINCENT F. SACCO, CRIME VICTIMS IN
CONTEXT (1998).
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compensation law-not current criminal law-is the most
appropriate response to crime. The victim's legitimate
interest-the victim's right as a person-is to regain her
ability to function as an autonomous person. The
punishment of the person responsible for damaging her
autonomy is only indirectly related to the victim's interest,
which might be satisfied without punishing the offender at
all.
The challenge of the criminal law is to find a way to
respect the rights of victims and offenders as persons rather
than to protect victim rights or offender rights. Victims'
rights will be vindicated, Dubber argues, only after we
abandon the concept of victims' rights and reform our law to
vindicate instead the rights of persons.
In Victims in the War on Crime, Markus Dubber
pursues the formidable task of trying to reconstitute the
practice of American criminal law through the eyes of crime
victims. Because he attempts a comprehensive critique of
the war on crime while simultaneously trying to vindicate
the rights of victims in the criminal process, some might
regard the attempt as over-ambitious. Yet Dubber succeeds
admirably.
Of course, the book has its weaknesses. Dubber's
condemnation of the war on crime is long on the law but
short on the politics; certainly, he could have borrowed
more from the existing critiques of that war. Likewise,
rather than relying primarily on the legal literature
(throughout), he could have better used the literature on
crime victims in sociology, criminal justice, and political
science. There, and even in the victimological literature,
Dubber would have found (albeit as minority voices) an
existing, critical foundation for the notable contributions he
has made with his book.
While admittedly addressing a very complex subject,
the writing (especially in the last couple of chapters)
sometimes gets bogged down.49 It is sometimes confusing,
for example, whether Dubber is describing things the way
they are or the way they ought to be. In examining the role
of compensation law, it is not always clear what about it
might be helpful (for reviving a legitimate criminal law)
49. The book also suffers from far too much repetition, including mini-
summaries and conclusions before and after each section, which are
unnecessary.
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and what might only make things worse. This makes the
reader wonder whether compensation law really makes
enough of a contribution to have emphasized it so much.
In addition, Dubber might be faulted for slighting other
correctional objectives and methods. Arguing against
incapacitation, Dubber nevertheless seems willing to accept
punishment as a legitimate goal, as long as it is applied in
response to real harms and not confused with the
restoration of victim autonomy. While Dubber might prefer
milder punishments, some argue that incarceration,
generally, cannot be justified, for reasons of race, class and
otherwise. Dubber glosses over 50  the now extensive
literature on restorative justice,51 which would apply a
peacemaking perspective to the criminal law. Since Dubber
complains about the victims' movement marginalizing
restorative justice, it is too bad that he has done so, too.
Likewise, Dubber sidesteps the role restitution might
play as an alternative or as a supplement to other
punishment. If offenders had the means for providing or
earning restitution to pay their victims, and if restitution
was more politically popular, it is unclear whether it would
fit into Dubber's scheme but it is a shame he did not discuss
it. From Dubber's perspective, restitution might on the one
hand have the value of focusing on interpersonal violence
and of removing the state from its overbearing central role
50. Dubber does acknowledge that the restorative justice movement has
made some inroads in getting victims and offenders together, often avoiding the
official criminal justice system. He correctly notes that the victims' movement
has marginalized restorative justice since it wants the victim to be formally
involved in the criminal process (whether it is in the victim's best interest or
not) and wants the focus to be on punishment, including a greater use of the
death penalty.
51. See, e.g., HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND
JUSTICE (1990); MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS (1991);
DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE (1997);
Ezzat A. Fattah, Toward A Victim Policy Aimed At Healing Not Suffering, in
VICTIMS OF CRIME 257-72 (Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 1997); DENNIS SULLIVAN &
LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2001); JOHN R. FULLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
A PEACEMAKING PERSPECTIVE (1998); RICHARD QUINNEY & JOHN WILDEMAN, THE
PROBLEM OF CRIME: A PEACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE (1991); HOWARD
ZEHR, TRANSCENDING: REFLECTIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS (2001); VICTIM POLICIES
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON THE ROAD TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Ezzat Fattah &
Susan Parmentier eds., 2001); HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS
AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002); HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002).
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in criminal justice.52 But perhaps Dubber worries that the
relationship restitution requires between victim and
offender might not be in the victim's best interest. It would
have been nice to know. 3
Similarly, Dubber leaves himself open to criticism by
deterrence advocates. Dubber makes convincing arguments
about the absurd predictions about criminal behavior that
seem embodied in possession offenses and other aspects of
the war on crime. But short of attributing dangerousness to
pure wind, is deterrent a legitimate objective? Why or why
not? Is there no deterrent effect to be had by the criminal
law? In fact, there seems to be precious little evidence of it,
but Dubber does not address it. Doing so would have
strengthened his arguments.
Despite these concerns, Victims in the War on Crime
makes an enormous contribution. Dubber has completed
remarkable legal and historical research, illuminating not
only where current American criminal law resides but also
where it has been and how it has gotten into its present
state. His compelling analysis of how the U.S. criminal
process really works is first-rate, as is his diagnosis of the
real objectives of the war on crime. Dubber makes one
insightful, provocative and original observation after
another, throughout this audacious and intelligent book.
While his arguments are subtle and nuanced, his warnings
about our distorted criminal law and our impending police
state ought to be taken very seriously, quite apart from the
way victims have been unwittingly enlisted in producing
them.
Dubber adds significantly to the research not only on
American criminal law but also to the broader (and
arguably more troubling) social control literature. Victims
in the War on Crime also lends considerable strength to the
small but growing number of dissenters in victimology, who
52. Wendy McElroy, Criminals Owe Debt to Victims, Not Society,
INDEPENDENT REVIEW (Dec. 30, 2003) at http://www.independent.org/
tii/news/031230McElroy.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
53. One also wonders how Dubber would evaluate the recent (if not
overblown) trend toward presenting the offender's own victimization as a
contributory factor to his crime, and as a mitigating factor for his conviction or
punishment. While this issue has arisen previously for female offenders who
kill or assault their male victimizers, the defense is now receiving a more
widespread use. See SAUNDRA DAVIS WESTERVELT, SHIFTING THE BLAME: How
VICTIMIZATION BECAME A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1999).
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have been urging academics and victim advocates to
reconsider and sever the victims' movement's alliance with
the state and with narrow law-and-order crusades.54
Certainly, Dubber's book suggests some radical and
promising reforms for criminal law and victim policy. One
can only hope that more people in the victims' movement
begin to take them seriously.
In the coming months, we will likely hear more about
the pending Victims' Rights Amendment. While such
constitutional amendments have been attempted
previously, this time it may get further than it ever has
before, and quite possibly will be ratified in the end.
Certainly the war on crime (which continues to flourish
long after crime has declined) provides an ideal climate for
a Victims' Rights Amendment. And now, the war on
terrorism has also been enlisted as a rationale for further
abandoning constitutional protections and toughening
criminal penalties-all in the name of helping victims. But
when politicians come to town hawking the Amendment as
the ultimate benefit for crime victims, we should-with
Victims in the War on Crime in mind-be very wary. The
Amendment might be snake oil rather than the tonic
victims really need.
54. See supra note 11.
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